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paper text:
The Role of Good Corporate Governance in The Association of Family
 Ownership Structure and
 Firm Performance: Indonesia Context 1Juniarti 1Department of Accountancy, Petra Christian University,
 Surabaya, Indonesia Abstract: In emerging countries like Indonesia, family ownership has greater discretion
 than those in developed nations in choosing policies to maximize their interest. Moreover, family ownership
 as a backbone of Indonesia listed companies, more than 95% of registered companies in Indonesia
 controlled by the family. It is essential to interested parties including government to discern the role of GCG
 level in the association for family ownership and firm performance. Prior research only assumed the level of
 GCG as general. This study measures the GCG level in each of the firms to avoid the misleading inferences
 of the superiority in family ownership performance. The results support that GCG level has a significant role
in moderating the relationship between family ownership and firm
 performance. Key words: Family ownership, Firm performance,
 GCG level INTRODUCTION A survey conducted by Price Water House and Coopers (PwC) on 2,800
 family-owned firms in 50 countries exposed that about 64% of these companies have recorded the
 staggering growth at least for the recent year [4]. Family ownership firms have a concern to transmit their
 firms to their descendants. The companies will act conservatively to avoid the impairment of the firm’s
 reputation. The
continuity of the business is the primary focus of the family members so
 that
 they endeavor to maximize the
long-term value of the firm [9; 11]. Family ownership firms eliminate the
 conflict of interest between manager and owner by increasing their monitoring activities to ensure that the
 management actions align with the owner interest [22; 11; 34]. Prior empirical results confirmed the
 superiority of family ownership over non-family ownership. Among others are [44; 31; 12; 37; 17; 46; 38; 3;
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 36]. They found
that family ownership has a positive association with the firm performance.
 However, these results
 are still inconclusive, several other researchers proved the opposite findings in which family firms
have a negative association with the performance.
 [39] using Fortune 1000 samples for the period 1996 to 2000; [28] using 744 big listed companies in 8 Asia
 countries; [15] using go-public
companies listed on Stock Exchange of Thailand for the year of 2005
 and [29] using big cap
companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) found the
negative association between family ownership structure and
 performance. Indeed the difference results of the
 prior studies
can be explained by Agency theory. According to the Type I of Agency
 Theory,
 family ownership can
mitigate the conflict of interest between owner and managers and
 finally reduce agency cost. Therefore family firms will have superior performance
than non- family firms. On the other hand, there
 is a severe side of family ownership since as the majority; they have an opportunity to expropriate the
 minority as implied by Agency Theory Type II [35; 27]. The majority will exploit minority interest by making
 policies that maximize their benefit at the expense of others. In the condition where the
level of corporate governance is low, the chance of the
 majority to expropriate minority will be higher and vice versa [29].
Corporate governance (CG) is as one of the mechanisms that be able to
 mitigate the negative impact of agency conflict. Higher quality of CG practices will better disciplines
 managers and concentrated owners to expropriate insubstantial parties [7]. According to [7], sound CG
 practices will reduce the cost of equity.
The role of corporate governance in the association of family firms and
 firm performance has been overlooked in some prior studies. Suspecting the conflicting results of previous
 researchers caused by agency problem type I or type II will be misleading, because of the results potentially
 different when the CG level is weak or strong. Besides that, it cannot directly be observed which agency
 problems type that exists. This research fills this gap by proposing
Good Corporate Governance (GCG) level in investigating the association of
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 family
ownership and firm performance. The probability of GCG level in
 moderating this
 relationship should be considered to achieve the robust results. Compared to the developed countries
 where the CG level is quite high, the level of GCG in developing countries is relatively low. Firms in
 emerging countries like Indonesia have greater discretion than those in developed nations in choosing
 policies to maximize their interest. Prior research only assumes the level of GCG as general [29], this study
 will measure the GCG level in each of firm to avoid the misleading inferences of the superiority of family
 ownership performance. Moreover, family ownership as a backbone of Indonesia listed companies, more
 than 95% of registered companies in Indonesia controlled by family [4]. It is essential to interested parties
 including government to discern the role of GCG level
in the association of family ownership and firm performance.
 LITERATURE REVIEW Agency Theory
Agency theory assumes that there is a conflict of interest between
 principal and agent,
 where each of party wants to maximize their benefit at the expense of another party [27]. The principal has
 an authority to mandate the agent, whereas the agent, as the parties carrying out this order [20]. Agency
 conflict produces agency cost, therefore it should be mitigated [25; 27; 22]. Agency cost includes monitoring
 cost, bonding cost, and residual loss [27; 22]. Monitoring costs are as the expenses that be borne
by the principal to monitor, measure, search and control agents 'behavior.
 Bonding costs
 are costs to assure that the agents comply the rules, policies and other regulations that have been
 established in contracts. The last, is the residual loss as the sacrifice of the principal to let their wealth
 reduced due to the different decisions between agent and principal [27]. [50] distinguish agency conflicts as
 the type I and type II of agency conflict. The first one
is the conflict between shareholders and management and the later,
 involves majority
 and minority investors. Agency conflicts can be minimized through the increase of insiders ownership [6].
 Insiders ownership are as the owner who is also as the managers. Managers who are also the owners will
 be careful in deciding since they will bear the impact of their adverse decision [16; 27].
Insider ownership is expected to match the interest of the principal and
 the agent. The higher the insider ownership, the
 higher the alignment level and the control ability in the interest of managers and owners. Finally, it will
 reduce the level of conflict of interest between them [27; 16). In addition to insider ownership, family
 ownership can also
be a useful tool to reduce the agency conflict between principal and
 agent. According to [3] and [19], one of the advantages of family ownership is
to reduce the agency conflict type I. The involvement of family in the
 company enabling them to effectively and efficiently monitor the activities of managers. The alignment of
 owner and manager can be achieved easily [22]. In the long-term, it will minimize the chance of managers
 to expropriate the owners'interests; business will be operated efficiently, thus the companies performance
 boost [27]. Even though the family ownership
is expected to reduce the agency problem type I, on the other hand,
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 this ownership potentially produces agency conflict type II [46; 33]. The agency problem will switch from
 principal-agent to majority-minority. Families as the majority have the opportunity to maximize their interest
 in the minority expenses. They have a great chance to make a policy that aimed to maximize their wealth by
 sacrificing the minority welfare [33; 50]. The potential of type II of agency conflict to worsen the
 company'performance should be considered in the firm where the family has the majority ownership [33; 41;
 14].
Family Ownership Structure and Firm Performance The family firm is a
 firm where the
family or family members own the majority of
 the substantial interests. Prior studies employed many proxies to define whether a business is a family firm
 or not, among others are family members hold a majority of company’assets [34], some of CEO or
 important positions are occupied by the family members [14; 3; 34; 5; 50; 13], and the significant control in a
 companies are embedded in family [40; 39]. This study
use the following criteria to identify whether a firm as a family
 ownership or not, first, the family owns at least 10% of companies' interest and second, one of the family
 members are in managerial position. The involvement of family will enhance the
control of the firm managers and will align the interest of principal and
 agent; therefore, it will reduce the agency costs and ceteris paribus, the firm performance will increase.
 However, the good side of family ownership will go hand in hand with its negative side. Families as the
 majority have an opportunity to expropriate the minority to maximize their interest as stated by Agency
 Theory Type II. The family may keep their relatives in managerial position even though their competencies
 and capabilities are in question, in addition, they might be set up the discretion which benefits their interest
 but harms others. In the long term, it will undermine the firm performance and bring the companies to the
 sustainability problems. Unlike developed have the high law enforcement, in Indonesia and many other
 developing countries, the law enforcement is quite low [28; 47; 29]. The power of the majority to expropriate
 the minority is enormous. By ignoring the level of good corporate governance (GCG) in each company, the
 existence of family ownership would negatively affect the achievement
of the company's performance. The probability of family ownership to
 diminish the firm performance is high in developing countries, mainly if the role of GCG is ignored.
 Therefore the
first hypothesis is as follow: Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a negative
 association between family ownership and firm performance. The Level
 of
 Good
Corporate Governance, Family ownership, and Firm Performance The
 essential factors that need to be considered in the association of
family ownership and firm performance is the level of GCG. The inclusion
 of this variable in the
 model is expected to give a better explanation. The role of GCG is essential since it can be used to mitigate
 the bad side of family firm. Managerial ownership and institutional ownership are the manifestations of the
 transparency principle of GCG. A manager who owns the company's stock will inevitably align interests with
 the importance of shareholders. The same mechanism is also occurred through the institutional ownership,
 according to [10] the institutional investors will reduce the selfish behavior of managers. [46] stated that
 institutional investors have an critical role in enforcing the rule. In managing the company according to the
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 general principles of GCG, the part of the commissioner independent is also indispensable. According to
 [49], the role of the board of commissioners is expected
to improve the quality of profit by limiting the opportunity of managers
 to manage earnings for their purposes. Besides
that, the existence of audit committees in the company
 is also expected to enhance the corporate governance level. Audit committees help the board of
 commissioners to oversight managers tightly. Their expertise and educational background in accounting
 and financial will sharp them to conduct effective and efficient monitoring of the company [30]. Companies
 with the high level of GCG imply that the level of control implementation is strong. It will minimize family
 members to act unproperly with other’s expenses. Some prior research found that
there is a positive association between the level of GCG implementation
 and firm performance
 [45; 43; 41]. Therefore,
companies with a higher level of GCG are expected to
 minimize the bad side of family ownership and boost its performance. Thus, the interaction of GCG and
 family ownership are predicted to moderate the association
between family ownership and firm performance. Hypothesis 2 : At the
 high level of
implementation of good corporate governance, the better the
 performance of the
 firm. METHODS Data All the public
companies that have listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) at least in
 2010 are selected as the research sample, however, bank and financial institution are excluded from the
 samples, since they do not have some data needed in this study. There are 1261 firm-year-observation
 from the six years of 2010 to 2015. As many as 796 samples (63.1%) are family ownership firms, while the
 remaining 465 samples (36.9%) are identified as non-family firms. 1. 2. Variables Operationalization Family
 Ownership. Two
criteria used to classify whether the firm is as a family firm or not, are the
 number of ownership, and
 the family position is managerial. If family own at least 10% of the total ownership or have
one or more family members or their relatives in the managerial area, the
 company
 is grouped as family ownership. This identification is searched manually based on information available in
 the annual reporting, company’s website and other publicly available information regarding the firm
 ownership. If the first criteria are fulfilled, no need to continue to search the second criteria. In this study,
 one of the two criteria is satisfied enough to classify whether companies as a family owned firm or not [33;
 21; 5]. Family ownership is binary variable in this study, score one if companies qualify one of the two
 criteria and 0, otherwise. Firm Performance. Firm performance
in this research is measured by return on assets (ROA)
23
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 following the prior studies (48; 2; 32). ROA is one of the general techniques to measure the capability of
 firms to generate financial performance since it collaborates two item of financial statements that is balance
 sheet and income statement simultaneously. The equation to calculate ROA is below:
Return On Asset (ROA) =    ………( 1) 
 Good Corporate Governance. GCG is measured using the self-assessment method. This method has been
 adopted by several institutions such Bank of Indonesia, The Indonesia Financial Services Authority (IFSA),
 Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise. They usually adjust this method according to their particular need.
 Indonesia Corporate Governance Forum (FCGI) have designed the general self-assessment tool that can
 be applied to all companies [23]. This study employs self-assessment method to measure GCG score,
 following FCGI method and adjusted by the Act of Limited Corporation No. 40, 2007, by focusing on the
 three aspects of GCG, i.e., Ownership Structure, Board of Commissioners and Audit Committee. Ownership
 structures (weight 40%) Ownership structures are measured based on managerial and institutional
 ownership structure.
Managerial ownership is the proportion of share owned by managerial to
 total outstanding share. According to
 [41], the ownership of managerial in the range of 0% - 5% will align the interest of managers and owners.
 Therefore, if the managerial ownership in that range will be scored by 1 and 0, otherwise.
Institutional ownership. Institutional ownership is the proportion share
 ownership by institutional
 to total outstanding share. [41] stated that the existing institutional ownership more than 25% will motivate
 the institutions to oversight tightly to the firms. Therefore, if the institutional ownership more than 25% will
 be scored by 1 and 0, otherwise. Board of Commissioners (weight 35%)
1. The Proportion of Board to Directors The effectiveness of the board of
 commissioners in the
 company can be denoted from the composition of the number of being supervised and the number of those
 supervise or directors. According to [42], at least, the structure of them should be balanced, to assure the
 effectiveness of monitoring. Therefore, if the proportion of board of commissioner to the directors equal to or
 above one will be scored 1 and 0 if the percentage of them is below 1. 2. The proportion of Independent
 Board of Commissioners In the good corporate mechanism, the existence of
independent commissioners in the Board of Commissioners
is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the monitoring process. IFSA
 requires that
 the proportion of
independent commissioners at least 30% of the number of Board of
 Commissioners.
 According to this requirement, score 1 is applied to the companies that satisfy the condition and 0,
 otherwise. Audit Committee (weight 25%) Committee of Audit
is one of the vital mechanism in good corporate governance, the
 existence of this committee is expected to strengthen the overall control of a company. Three items of Audit
 Committee will be scored that
is the number of the audit committee, the proportion of independent
 audit committee and their
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 competence. 1. The
number of audit committee According to the guideline of
 GCG implementation, companies required to have at least 3 members
of the audit committee, therefore if the amount of the audit committee
 of the firm equal to or above 3 will be scored 1 and 0, otherwise. 2. The proportion of independent audit
 committee Companies are also required to have at least one member of
an independent audit committee. The portion of the independent audit
 committee should be equal to
 or above 0.33 if the requirement is satisfied, the score 1 is applied and 0, otherwise. 3. The competence of
Audit Committee members The capability of audit committee members
 is
 also considered in this scoring. According to the Bapepam Decree No.29/PM/2004 article IX.1.5 stated
at least that one member of the audit committee should have
 particular educational background or experience related to accounting or finance. If one of the members
 qualify, this requirement will be scored 1 and 0, otherwise. Then, all the above assessment will be
 calculated using the following equation to get the score of GCG of each company. The higher the score
 implies, the higher level of GCG implementation in an organization.   = (    × %) +   (
     × %) +   (    
 %)............................ (2)   Control Variables Firm Size
Firm size can be associated with the firm’
 s capability to achieve the financial performance of companies. It usually related to one of following
 indicators such as the number of assets owned by the company, the number of sales,
number of employees or the amount of the net assets of the firm.
 Companies that have large size will be more accessible to achieve good performance compared with small
 one. They can utilize their assets efficiently so that their financial performance increase (1; 12; 47]. Firm
 size is used to differentiate company as a big or small company [8). This study uses
natural log of assets to measure the firm size
 (47; Hamberg et al. 2013; 44; 3; 36). Firm Size: Ln (Total Asset)…………………..........(3) Industrial Sectors
 This study includes industrial sector in the model, to anticipate whether the industrial areas provide the
 different explanation. A dummy variable is applied to industrial sectors. Analysis To analyze panel data,
 several steps are run to determine best model of panel data, whether
pooled least square (PLS), fixed effect or random effect
 models. The
fixed effects are dummy variables for each year of the sample and
 companies code. Panel data are finally satisfied with the fixed effect model. To detect heteroscedasticity,
 this study uses Breusch-Pagan /Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity test. Generalized least square is
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 also referred to resolve the problem of heteroscedasticity. Below is model of analysis of this study: ,= α+ 1
 ,−1 + 2 ,−1 + 3   ,−1 − 1 + 4,−1 + 5 ,−1 +  (4) Where: , = Return on asset
firm i for the period of t  ,−1
 = Family ownership
firm i for the period of t-1 , −1 = Score of
 good corporate governance
firm i for the period of t- 1  ,−1=
 Firm size measured by
natural log of total assets firm i for the period of t-
 1 ,−1= Industrial sector
firm i for the period of t- 1 ɛ = Error term.
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Data consist of 240 firms, each has five to six years observations, so that
 the panel data is unbalanced. There are 1261 firm-year-observation from the six years of 2010 to 2015. In
 panel data, the time variant and individual variant is possible, by assuming that all the variants are constant,
 data are analyzed using PLS. Next, fixed effect model is employed to data analysis. To decide whether
 common model (PLS) or uncommon model (fixed effect) is more fitting, then Chow test is applied. The
 result shows that probability F test is less than 0.05, thus fixed effect model is more appropriate than PLS.
 Further test is run
to determine whether fixed effect or random effect model is
 the best for data analysis. Based on Hausman test, H0 cannot be rejected, since the probability of Chi2 is
 less than 0.05, it is mean that fixed effect model is the best model
in this study. Table 1 presents the profile of sample firms. Family firms
 show different characteristic from those of
non-family firm. The size of family firms, on average is relatively smaller
 than non-family firms. The performance of family firms
 is slightly lower than non- family firm, the mean, a minimum and maximum score of ROA is smaller than
 those on
non-family firms. The level of GCG in both firms is
 equal each other, however, family firms have the minimum score of GCG (0.25) higher than min score of
 GCG in the non- family firm (0.175). Family firms on average have more concern for the GCG
 implementation than non- family firm. Hasil pengujian hipotesis 1, menunjukkan variabel FMO Table 1.
 Decriptive Statistic
Panel A. Summary Statistic for The Full Sample Variable
 All Firms FM O Non FMO ROA
mean 0. 04754 0. 02843 0. 08026 std dev 0. 32543 0. 16852 0. 48707 min -1.
 72905 -1.
546
27
63
18
17
 72905 -0.86921 max 9.74302 1.85171 9.74302 GCG
mean 0. 67871 0. 68085 0. 67534 std dev 0. 17585 0. 17133 0. 18346 min 0.
 17500 0. 25000 0.
 17500 max 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 LOGTA mean 4.52465 3.99638 5.42897 std dev 1.80202 2.10060
 0.95088 min 5.01650 5.01650 6.15216 max 13.96299 13.96299 13.91678 Obs 1261 796 465 Panel B.
 Correlation Data ROA FMO GCG FMOGCG LOGTA IDSEC ROA 1 FMO -0.0769 1 GCG -0.0449 0.0147 1
 FMOGCG -0.0573 0.9239 0.3097 1 LOGTA 0.0351 -0.1184 -0.1833 IDSEC -0.0564 0.0835 0.1942 -0.1665
 0.1057 -0.8568 1 1 Table 2 shows that FMO
has a negative and significant at level 1%, this
 result confirms the prior studies (47, 29, 28) that in developing countries, the existence of family ownership
 harms the firm performance. The switching conflict of interest to the majority-minority interest has occurred
 as predicted by Agency Theory Type II. The incentive of the majority to abuse the minority for their benefit
 will be costly for the companies as a whole. Greediness to immediately attract short-term profits makes the
 majority justify ways to do it. The developing country situation that is weak minority protection, low law
 enforcement and lack of adequate internal control to protect all parties makes the majority have the
 discretion to prosper their own at the expense others. The presence of family-dominated controls makes
 families more likely to retain family members in managerial positions even though they lack adequate
 competence [1; 19; 46). The family effort to keep family members in the managerial position will result in
 ineffective and inefficient decision making. Further, it will lead to other costs that are detrimental to the
 company and will decrease company performance (Andersen and Reeb, 2003). It is also interesting to see
 that GCG alone, has a negative association with the firm performance. GCG implementation only burdens
 the company costs thus lowering firm performance. Overall, GCG practices have the negative relationship
 to the firm performance in both hypothesis 1 and 2; this result is possible to mislead the conclusion of the
 role of GCG, it seems that GCG just increase cost and has no impact to the performance. However, further
 testing in each of sample groups (Table 3) proves that GCG
has a positive effect on the performance of family firms. This result is
 opposed to
 what happened in non-family firms, where GCG consistent
has a negative association with firm
 performance. Table 2. Ownership, Firm Performance and GCG Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Variable ROA
 ROA Intercept 0.24776 (3.09) *** 1.17896 (0.81) FMO -0.05184 (-2.28) ** -0.84655 (-3.05) *** GCG
 -0.10099 * (-1.68) -1.23254 (-6.33) *** FMOGCG 1.27980 (5.23) *** LOGTA IDSEC Rq-within between
 overall F -0.00382 -0.01317 (-1.06) (-0.70) -0.019239 -0.05909 (-1.53) (-0.17) 0.013 0.036 0.028 0.014
 0.011 0.013 11.55 *** 8.180 ***
Notes: *, * * and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 or 1
 percent level, respectively. N = 240 Firms. Table
 3. GCG and Performance in FMO and Non-FMO Variable FMO ROA Non-FMO ROA Intercept 0.16500
 (0.75) 0.33824 (2.47) ** GCG 0.07673 (-2.14) ** LOGTA -0.02414 (-0.93) IDSEC -0.970404 (0.75) Rq
 0.0091 F 2.41 * -0.27653 (-2.06) ** -0.00023 (-0.03) -0.01722 (-0.37) 0.01840 2.88 ** As predicted, the
 interaction of GCG and FMO shows the positive association with firm performance and significant at level
 1%, it means that GCG has been successfully reducing the negative impact of family ownership. The
 implementation of GCG in the family firms alter the negative side of family ownership into the positive side.
 The higher level of GCG practices reduces the opportunity for the majority to expropriate minority. Family
 behaves reasonably in decision making to avoid the negative consequences of their behavior. Besides, the
 majority is required to treat minority equally, it will minimize cost to expropriate minority. The mechanism of
 appointing the president director and other managerial positions must be through a transparent and
 accountable process. Family cannot keep underperformed family managers in the managerial position
 because the excellent governance practices make impossible to do that. It will cut unnecessary
 expenditures including irrational compensation to their relatives; thus the use of resources become efficient
 and effective, as a result, firm performance increases. Family companies have a number of advantages in
 addition to some weaknesses. In such condition, GCG just shifts the bad side to
reinforce the excellent of the family firm. Unlike non -family firms that have
 the
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39
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57
 scattered interests and even conflicting each other, family firm has the same vision to prosper their families
 and to handover it to their successor. The favorable circumstances in family firm make it easier to be
 controlled than non-family firm. The authority of Indonesia should note this finding to lessen the
negative impact of family ownership. Also, family ownership is the
 backbone of
 Indonesia listed companies; it is needed an integrated panacea to eliminate the adverse effects of family
 ownership. CONCLUSION The
primary goal of this research is to highlight the role of
 GCG
in the association of family ownership and firm performance. GCG is
 expected to reduce the
 bad side of family ownership in expropriating the minority. In developing countries like Indonesia, the
 negative impact of family ownership is more dominant than the positive ones. This study confirms the
 previous finding that family ownership tends to lower firm performance. Circumstances in developing
 countries such as the lack of law enforcement, low minority protection, and other various factors are
 inspiring family to expropriate minority. Interestingly, as it is hypothesized, the existence of GCG
at the firm level, successfully switches the negative side of family ownership
 to the
 positive one.
The higher the level of GCG implementation the higher the
 chance of family firm achieves a sound financial performance. GCG has a significant role to limit the family
 to exproriate the minority. IFSA should note this finding to lessen the negative impact of family ownership.
 As reported by the PWC survey, that family ownership is the backbone of Indonesia listed companies; it is
 needed an integrated panacea to eliminate the negative impact of family ownership. This finding underlines
 the urgency to continuously support the implementation of GCG since a robust application implies that the
 control mechanisms in the entities are going well. Therefore, the policy of The Authority of Financial
 Services as the custodian of code and principles of GCG in Indonesia that required the companies to
 implement GCG is on the right track (IoD Report, 2016). This policy has also resulted in a good trend of
 GCG implementation in Indonesia. According to IoD Report, Indonesia has been in a group of countries
 with a good implementation ranking. This study does not differentiate the status of the family in family
 ownership, whether they are founder or successor. Their spirit could be different. Usually, the founders
 have more concern and struggle to make the companies exist and grow than that of their successors.
 Further exploration of the kind of family whether as the founder or the successors can be considered in the
 future research, to have a comprehensive insight
on the role of family ownership in keeping a higher firm
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